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Sport is becoming an activity of increasing importance: over time more people participate in
sport (active sport consumption), more time is spent watching sport (passive sport consumption).
An important part of sport consumption is passive sport consumption where production and
consumption are separate: (professional) athletes engage in a contest, and fans pay to watch the
contest. An important characteristic of sport that generates this demand is relative competition:
the competitiveness of a particular match or league. In this paper, we set out to measure compet-
itive balance in three sports (soccer, tennis, and skating), and assess its development over time.
As we separate variation in quality of teams or athletes from randomness of outcome, we can
compare relative competition in these three sports.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Sport is becoming an activity of increasing importance: over time more
people participate in sport (active sport consumption), more time is spent
watching sport (passive sport consumption), and even academics in eco-
nomics study sport in either its own right, or as an application of theory
and methods. This increasing importance has resulted in (policy) studies try-
ing to estimate the economic value generated by sport, two examples are
Ecorys (2005) and Policy Research Corporation (2008). In the first study, the
total value added of football in The Netherlands (both professional and ama-
teur) is estimated at C1.4 billion. In the second study, total value added (both
direct and indirect) of sport in The Netherlands is estimated to be 1.3% of
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BBP (C7.9 billion), and the share of total employment is estimated to be 1.7%.
Much larger numbers are reported by Dimitrov et al. (2006), who estimate
the contribution of sport to total value added in the EU to be 3.7%, and the
share of employment to be 5.4%. Besides these estimates that capture eco-
nomic significance of sport in general, there are separate estimates for spe-
cial large scale events, such as Olympic Games or the World Cup soccer. In
such studies, focus is usually on the impact of the event. For example, Brenke
and Wagner (2006, 2007) estimate that the World Cup 2006 in Germany did
not have any business cycle effects. As stressed by all authors, these numbers
are only rough indications of the economic relevance of sport and particu-
lar events. Sport does not enter the national accounts as a separate activity,
even though some proposals to develop sport satellite accounts have been put
forward. Moreover, it is hard to define ‘sport’ precisely, and even harder to
determine all activity that can attributed to sport.
An important part of sport consumption is passive sport consumption where
production and consumption are separate: (professional) athletes engage in a
contest, and fans pay to watch the contest. The contest may be watched in a sta-
dium, but also on (pay) television or the internet. The costs of consumption are
more than the monetized costs of a ticket and travel, as time spent traveling and
watching the game are not usually taken into account. Travel costs in particular
limit the drawing power of a team or an event.
Fans are willing to pay to watch a contest, because certain characteris-
tics of the sport product are scarce, and these characteristics are valued by
the fans. Fort (2006) distinguishes four such characteristics: athletic prowess,
absolute and relative quality of the contest, commonality, and the joy of vic-
tory. The best athletes are able to do things that are seemingly impossible,
sport sometimes resembles performing art. Absolute quality refers to the level
of play, say the difference between a soccer game in the Champions league
versus a game in the Dutch Eredivisie. Relative quality is the uncertainty of
outcome, or the competitiveness of a league. Commonality is the common
bond between people provided by sport. People watch sport, read about it,
and sport provides a topic of conversation. Loyalty to a particular team is
often a source of solidarity among groups of individuals.
Sport economists have mainly focused on the second characteristic: rela-
tive quality of play. This characteristic is also known as competitive balance.
Necessity of some balance of competition is unique to sport: no contest can
be produced if there are no opponents. In fact, the duration of a boxing con-
test is directly related to the evenness of both opponents. From the point of
view of the contest, it is in their mutual interest to face a strong opponent,
though both boxers individually would probably prefer a weaker opponent
from a sporting point of view. This is known as the Louis-Schmeling para-
dox, after the American boxer Joe Louis who discovered in the 1930s that
the fans were willing to pay more if the contest lasted longer. The league
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produces competitive excitement, and it may be of interest to the league to sup-
portweaker teams so that both relative andabsolutequalityof play ismaintained.
Regulatory agencies as theNMAagreewith this point of view, and allowauction-
ing of television rights of soccer games at a league level, as opposed to auctioning
such broadcasting rights by each team individually. The European Commission
has likewise agreed that thepeculiarnatureof sport requires sometimes somewhat
collusive behavior between teams. A sport contest in a league is more valuable
than an individual contest by itself: suggestive evidence is given by the smaller
crowds attracted by friendly games.
In this paper, we set out to measure competitive balance in three sports,
and assess its development over time. We try to separate variation in talent
from variation in outcome. Given a certain talent distribution, rules and insti-
tutions in a sport determine the translation of this variation into variation
of performance. Before doing so, we start with a brief theoretical discussion
in Section 2. In Section 3 we measure competitive balance in soccer, both at
national levels and at the level of international competitions for club teams.
Changes of competitive balance (or lack thereof) will be related to changes in
the economic environment of the league. In Section 4, we discuss competitive
balance in two individual sports: tennis and speed skating. Most measures of
competition to be discussed are parameters of relatively simple econometric
models. As we separate variation in quality of teams or athletes from ran-
domness of outcome, we can compare relative competition in the three sports
that we consider. We do so in Section 5, and we also conclude in that section.
2 COMPETITIVE BALANCE: THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENTS
The first article in the academic literature to study competitive balance is
Rottenberg (1956), which studies the effect of limited player mobility (the
‘reserve clause’) on competitive balance in professional baseball. This paper has
been the point of reference of almost all other studies of competitive balance in
sport played in the United States and is the origin of sport economics as a field
of academic research. According to the so-called ‘reserve clause’, a team retained
the option to renew the contract of a player under the same terms as the existing
contract, with the exception that salary under the new contract could not be less
than 75% of current salary. The clause has been in existence from 1876 to 1975,
and its intentwas to suppress thewage level of players and to limit theunequal dis-
tribution of talent between teams. Effectively, the clause created amonopsonistic
market for player talent. Rottenberg questioned whether such a monopsonistic
restriction would create unbalanced competition. In his paper, he assumes that
the revenue function of a team is characterized by two main features. First, both
absolute quality and relative quality of play enter the utility function of fans, so
the revenue of a team is maximized at a win-loss record above 50% and below
100%. The second feature is that local markets differ in size, so, ceteris paribus,
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a team in a large market will be able to generate more revenue from an increase
of quality of play than a team in a small market. Teams are assumed tomaximize
profits, and hire players up to equality of marginal cost of talent and marginal
revenue product. Furthermore, supply of talent is elastic, but players are not per-
fect substitutes (this is sport!). Finally, Rottenberg assumes that the market for
player contracts is competitive. It follows that in such amarket the distribution of
talent over teams is identical to the onewhere players would be free agents, which
is known as Rottenbergs invariance hypothesis. The next most valuable player in
a large market teammay bemore valuable to the team in the next largest market,
and hence, that teamwould bewilling to buy the players contract from the largest
market team. Alternatively, the smaller teamwould be willing to outbid the larg-
est market team in a competitive labour market that would exist if players were
free agents. The effect of the reserve clause is that player salaries are lower than
theywouldbe ina competitive labourmarket, thedifferencebeing capturedby the
ownerof the team.The reserve clausedoesnotaffect thedistributionof talentover
teams, and hence, has no effect on competitive balance. Clearly, this argument is
related to the Coase Theorem, although the role of transaction costs is ignored in
Rottenberg (1956). Fort (2005) argues that the invariance hypothesis of Rotten-
berg can be considered a weak form of the Coase Theorem (that it predates by
4 years), but that the analysis in Rottenbergs paper deals with many other issues
as well.
The key assumption that drives Rottenbergs invariance hypothesis is that
teams are profit maximizers. Although this assumption is reasonable for Ameri-
can team sports, it is not for the most important sport in Europe: soccer. A more
appropriate setting might be Sloane (1971) which takes a different approach by
assuming that teams are utility maximizers, subject to a budget constraint. Argu-
ments of the utility function are playing success, average attendance, health of
the league, and financial surplus, with playing success being of most importance.
Under such assumptions, the mechanism that equilibrates competitive balance
in Rottenbergs model, the transfer of talent between teams, is absent: no team
will adopt ‘running behind’ as a policy (even though that may be profit maximiz-
ing).Moreover, star players will be concentrated in teams from larger markets as
this maximizes their probability of success, also because teams that are successful
in their national league will compete in international leagues as the Champions
League and the UEFA Cup. Competition will be tougher in these international
leagues, playing success in such leagues is highly valued. Using this framework,
Sandy et al. (2004) show that teams from smaller markets will have a lower win-
loss percentage than teams from bigger markets, and also that these teams are
financially viable only for a smaller range of win percentages. In this approach,
a somewhat balanced competition is not an endogenous outcome and Sloane
(1971) concludes that ‘there would appear to be some justification for restriction
of competition in one form or another in order to maintain the degree of sporting
competition and, therefore, the financial stability of the game’ (p. 145).
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From these early contributions on, the literature on competitive balance
has diverged more or less along a theoretical line and an empirical line. The-
oretical papers have focused on popular instruments to maintain competitive
balance as the retain and transfer system, salary cap, rookie draft, revenue
sharing (broadcasting rights and/or gate receipts), and the luxury tax (where
salary payments above a certain threshold are taxed by the league). Effec-
tiveness of these instruments depends on the objective function of the team:
profit maximization or win maximization, and on specification of the model
(is the total supply of talent fixed? do fans care about the aggregate quality
of a league? etc.). As most of these models consider a league with two teams,
competitive balance is measured by the ratio of wins, or by the difference
of the win probabilities. An nice comparison of behavior profit maximizing
teams versus win maximizing teams is given in Ke´senne (2007a).
The empirical literature has mainly focused on teams sports in the US,
and competitive balance is usually measured by comparing the actual perfor-
mance in a league to the performance one would expect if all teams would
have the same playing strength (Scully 1989). This is usually implemented by
estimating the standard deviation of win percentages of teams in a league.
However, as argued by Vrooman (1996) there are multiple dimensions to
competitive balance. There is within-season uncertainty of outcome, but also
potential dominance by large market teams, and persistence of performance.
These dimensions can be estimated in different ways, and we will do so in the
next two sections.
3 MEASUREMENT OF COMPETITIVE BALANCE: SOCCER
Soccer is by far the most important team sport in Europe, as measured by
attendance at games, number of television viewers, or financial turnover. In
this study we have chosen to focus on club teams rather than national teams.
The better club teams participate in a domestic league, and try to qualify
for participation in the two main international leagues (the UEFA Champi-
ons League and the UEFA Cup). In this section we measure competitive bal-
ance at both levels, and we relate any changes to changes in the structure of
professional soccer.
3.1 National Soccer Leagues
Competitive balance in national soccer leagues has been well studied theo-
retically, especially after the Bosman ruling in 1995. Before that year, teams
were restricted in the number of non-domestic players they could field, and
could demand a transfer fee for a player, even if his contract had expired.
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After the Bosman ruling by the European Court of Justice in 1995, restrictions
on the number of players from the EU were lifted, and players were auto-
matically free agents upon expiration of their contract, effectively creating
an open European labour market for soccer talent. This resulted in an
increase in player mobility, and a concentration of playing talent with large
market teams. Teams from smaller countries (for example, Sweden, Belgium,
The Netherlands) have to now compete for talent with teams from much
larger markets (as England, Spain, Italy).
A second major change in the structure of European soccer is the intro-
duction of the Champions League in 1993, the market pool in 1997, and
the expansion to multiple teams per country as of the 1997/1998 season.
This European league has proven to be very successful in generating large
television and sponsor revenues. Approximately 75% of these revenues are
redistributed among the teams that participate. One half of this amount is
redistributed based on performance in the Champions League, the other half
is proportional to the share of television revenues generated in the country of
the team. Because of this so-called market pool, teams from large markets are
guaranteed to receive a large share of total revenues. The Champions League
is much more lucrative than the UEFA Cup: in 2007/2008 total payout by
the UEFA to the 53 teams participating in the UEFA Cup was MC37.1,
while the 32 participants in the Champions League distributed MC585.6.
Until 1996/1997, only domestic champions could participate in next seasons
Champions League. From 1997/1998 onwards, the Champions League was
expanded from 24 to 55 participants and multiple teams from the larger
European leagues participated.
Theoretical consequences of these changes have been examined by differ-
ent authors, Ke´senne (2007b) being one of the more recent ones. He proposes
a simple model with two teams (a larger one and a smaller one) and two
countries (a larger market and a smaller market). Revenue of a team depends
on the number of stadium spectators and the size of the national market, and
decreases if the win percentage is too large. Teams maximize win percent-
age and spend all their revenues on players. Before the opening of the labour
market, the teams from the larger markets have the higher win probability in
their domestic leagues. Once the labour market is liberalized, the performance
gap between the teams from the larger country and those from the smaller
country increases, while competitive balance within each national league does
not change. He substantiates this prediction by comparing team budgets and
success in the Champions league between large and small countries; he does
not estimate competitive balance or its development over time.
To measure competitive balance in soccer, it is not sufficient to calculate
winning percentages, as is usually done for American sports. First of all,
approximately 25% of all soccer games end in a draw, and second, home
advantage is an important characteristic of soccer. Home advantage has been
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extensively studied and the factors that affect home advantage are different
from those that affect variation in quality. To separate team quality, home
advantage, and luck, we use a rating model proposed by Clarke and Norman
(1995). The goal difference GD i j in a game between teams i (home) and j
(away) depends on home advantage hi , difference in quality θi −θ j , and ran-
dom factors:
GDij = hi + θi − θ j + εi j . (1)
Home advantage hi is the margin by which the home team is expected to win,
if it were to play an opponent of equal quality: E(GDi j )= hi if θi = θ j . The
quality parameters θi and θ j are not identified in model (1): both parameters
can be increased with a constant c, without affecting the probability distribu-
tion of the observable outcome variable GD i j . We impose the normalization∑n
i=1 θi = 0, with n the number of teams. This means that average quality
is zero, so the θ -parameters measure quality with respect to a hypothetical
team with quality zero. A team with a positive θ is better than average, a
team with a negative θ is a below average team. θi itself can now be inter-
preted as the expected win margin if team i would play an average team
(θ j =0) on a neutral venue (hi =0).
Within season competitive balance is now measured as the standard devi-
ation of θi , σθ . In a fully balanced league, all θ ’s will be 0 (all teams are as
good as the average team), and σθ is 0. In an unbalanced league σθ will be
larger. We estimate model (1) by OLS on a dataset with results on 134092
professional soccer games since 1945/1946. The data set has information on
domestic leagues of seven countries, three large markets (England, Italy, and
Spain), two small markets (Belgium and The Netherlands), and two interme-
diate cases (France and Germany). Model (1) is estimated for each season,
and the estimated values for σθ are graphed in Figure 1. To aid the inter-
pretation, a non-parametric regression is estimated in each panel to highlight
any trends, and the vertical grey line indicates 1996. The global picture that
emerges from this graph is mixed. In France and Spain there is a long term
trend towards a more balanced league, but the changes of competitive bal-
ance in all countries are small compared to year-to-year variation. Within the
same league, some seasons are more balanced than others.
Another dimension of competitive balance, dominance of large market
teams, is calculated using this data set as well. Dominance of large market
teams can be measured by calculating a concentration ratio: the number of
points in the final ranking obtained by the best k teams, divided by the max-
imum number of points they could have obtained. This ratio is shown in
Figure 2. In both England and Italy the large market teams have been able to
collect more points against the lesser opponents over time. Compared to
other countries, the Dutch league is relatively dominated by the best four





































Figure 1 – Standard deviation of team quality over time
teams: they capture on average 75% of all points, both during the twenty sea-
sons before the Bosman ruling, and after the Bosman ruling. Again, though,
year-to-year variation is significant.
3.2 International Soccer
To our knowledge there is no empirical study of competitive balance in the
Champions League or UEFA Cup. One practical problem in undertaking
such a study is that teams participating in a given year may not participate
the year after. If a team performs badly in the Champions League, it is likely
not to qualify for next season’s Champions League. Instead, it will be
replaced by a stronger team from the domestic league. At the level of Euro-
pean competitions, competitive balance is better analyzed at country level.
Most soccer fans from a given country will identify with a team from their





























Figure 2 – Concentration ratio CR 4 over time
country, even if it is not their favorite domestic team. According to the
theoretical model of Ke´senne (2007b) and also argued in Haan et al. (2008),
soccer talent concentrates in the large leagues as a consequence of opening
the labour market. Moreover, the market pool ensures that teams from coun-
tries with large television revenues receive a large share of total revenues,
independent of performance. One expects success in the Champions League
to be concentrated and persistent.
Concentration of success at a country level in the Champions League is
large. 34 out of all 44 semi-final positions since 1997/1998 (as of that season,
multiple teams per country could participate in the Champions League) have
been taken by teams from the large market countries: England, Italy, and
Spain. The UEFA Cup is more competitive, only 25 semi-final positions have
been taken by teams from these three countries. Persistence of success has
increased significantly as well. The UEFA measures performance of teams
from a country by the so-called UEFA Club Competitions Associations’
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Figure 3 – Pearson’s correlation of UEFA country coefficients
Coefficient. The 5-year sum of this coefficient determines the number of slots
for each country in the Champions League and the UEFA Cup. In Figure 3
we show the development of the autocorrelation of this country coefficient
over time. As of 1998 (indicated by the grey line), when the effects of opening
the labour market were into full force, the autocorrelation increased from an
average value of 0.68 (1980–1998) to 0.87 (1999–2007). Success in European
leagues have become more persistent. The effect of concentration of talent in
big leagues due to opening the labour market has been exacerbated by the
decision of the UEFA to allow multiple teams per country in the Champi-
ons League. It is more attractive for talent to play for the third-best team in
a large league, where salaries are higher, than to play for the best team in
smaller leagues. The third-best team of a large league and the best team of a
small league can both participate in the Champions League.
4 MEASUREMENT OF COMPETITIVE BALANCE: INDIVIDUAL SPORTS
Most studies in the literature are concerned with the analysis of competitive
balance of team sports, rather than individual sports. The reason is proba-
bly that the mechanism that can be used to change competitive balance in
team sports is well understood: balance can be changed by changing the dis-
tribution of talent over teams. This can be done by altering the marginal
cost of talent, its marginal revenue product, or the budget restriction of the
team. In individual sports, such channels are not available. Balance in indi-
vidual sport is analyzed by focusing on how differences of talent translate
into differences of performance. A natural definition of a fully balanced con-
test is then one as one where “each participant starts with an equal chance
of winning” (Szymanski 2001). However, this definition is not well applicable
to individual sports where performance is measured by an absolute yardstick
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as time taken to skate a particular distance. Considering the heterogeneity
of individual sports, it is not surprising that there are no generally accepted
measures of balance in individual sports. Different tailor made measures cap-
ture different dimensions, as we show in our two examples: professional ten-
nis and speed skating. Although these two examples are interesting in their
own right, they represent two different types of individual sports. In tennis,
and other related sports such as badminton and table tennis, the winner is
determined by a sequence of contests between two athletes and one wins a
contest by beating his or her opponent in a particular game. In contrast, a
skater wins based on an absolute measure of performance: time. The skater
competes with all skaters in an event, which is also the case in, for example,
golf.
4.1 Tennis
Tennis is one of the most popular individual sports. In this section, we con-
sider measurement of competitive balance for individual professional players,
so we do not analyze national leagues for teams or tournaments for country
teams (as the Davis Cup). The sport is organized as a collection of tourna-
ments, that are played throughout the year in different locations. The main
tournaments are the four Grand Slam tournaments (that predate the forma-
tion of the international governing body in tennis), and ATP tournaments for
men and WTA tournaments for women. Tennis is a professional sport since
1968, and the size of the pool of top tennis players is relatively large. Rules
in tennis have not changed much since the early 1900s, with the exception of
the introduction of the tiebreak in 1971 (to shorten the duration of a contest)
and the recent introduction of the option of video replay when a decision of
a linesman is contested by one of players.
Participation in tournaments provides not only monetary income to the
players (prize money), but also in-kind income. Based on their performance
in the tournament, players receive points. Points collected during the last
52weeks period are added to generate a world ranking. A high position in
this ranking guarantees entry to major tournaments (lower ranked players
have to participate in a qualification tournament, or have to receive a wild-
card from the organization), and a seeded position in the draw so that a
top player does not encounter another top player early in the tournament.
Moreover, highly ranked players may be invited to lucrative exhibition tour-
naments.
Competition in tennis has been analyzed in Du Bois and Heyndels
(2007) and del Corral (2008). Both papers focus on a comparison between
competition in the men’s circuit and in the women’s circuit. The empir-
ical measures used in the first paper are closest to the ones we use in
the previous section. Du Bois-Heyndels distinguish between four dimensions
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of competitive balance: match-specific uncertainty, seasonal uncertainty,
inter-seasonal uncertainty, and long term dominance. Their measure of
match-specific uncertainty is the number of tiebreaks in Grand Slam finals,
and they find that the fraction of sets decided in a tiebreak is not different
between men and women. Even though this measure can be used as an
ex-post measure of match-specific uncertainty, it is less relevant as an ex-ante
measure. Ex-ante measures are more likely to determine the number of spec-
tators or the size of a television audience. Instead, an approach based on
individual contests where talent is related to outcomes, is preferable. Consider
a game between two players A and B, with respective world rankings RA and
RB . If tennis is fully balanced, difference in ranking should be a non-signif-
icant or weak predictor of the outcome of the contest. To test this, we use
a logit model that relates the outcome of the contest to the difference of log
rankings:1
Pr(A  B)= 1
1+ exp(−β(log RA − log RB)) . (2)
In this equation, we use the differences of log ranks as suggested by Klaassen
and Magnus (2001) because this is a smoother measure of expected differ-
ence of performance, and because it is more consistent with the pyramid
structure of tennis rankings: the quality difference between players ranked 1
and 2 is usually greater than the quality difference between players ranked
101 and 102. If tennis is fully balanced, one would find β = 0, if there is
little match uncertainty β will be large and negative. β measures the effi-
ciency of translating talent differences into performance differences. Interpre-
tation of the parameter β in model (2) depends on the data set that is used:
it can be used to describe seasonal competitive balance, but also competi-
tive balance in particular tournaments when the data set is restricted to such
tournaments.
We estimate model (2) using two data sets consisting of individual match
results. For men, the data set has information about results in Grand Slam
tournaments, and the two main types of ATP tournaments: Masters Tour-
naments and International Tournaments. The data set covers 2000–2008 and
consists of 22811 matches. The dataset for women covers 2007 and 2008 only,
and has 4417 match results. The estimation results are given in Tables 1
and 2. The overall estimate for β for men is −0.373 (significantly different
from 0), which implies a 0.35 probability that the player ranked tenth on
the World Ranking beats number two. For women, the overall estimate is
−0.501 and the corresponding probability is 0.30. In the tables, we also con-
dition on type of tournament and year. For men, every year the estimate for
1 In order to ensure a consistent model, only differences of individual specific variables can
enter the index, see Koning (2008).
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TABLE 1 – ESTIMATION RESULTS COMPETITIVE BALANCE, MEN’S TENNIS
Grand Slam Masters International All series
2000 −0.415 −0.279 −0.371 −0.358
2001 −0.434 −0.220 −0.326 −0.324
2002 −0.355 −0.301 −0.343 −0.336
2003 −0.439 −0.231 −0.423 −0.376
2004 −0.364 −0.311 −0.345 −0.341
2005 −0.496 −0.336 −0.484 −0.448
2006 −0.469 −0.402 −0.380 −0.404
2007 −0.563 −0.307 −0.386 −0.397
2008 −0.639 −0.352 −0.419
All Years −0.444 −0.297 −0.379 −0.373
TABLE 2 – ESTIMATION RESULTS COMPETITIVE BALANCE, WOMEN’S TENNIS
Grand Slam WTA 1 or 2 WTA 3 or 4 All series
2007 −0.612 −0.554 −0.521 −0.558
2008 −0.462 −0.402 −0.484 −0.442
All Years −0.532 −0.479 −0.504 −0.501
the Grand Slam matches is lower than the estimates for the other types of
tournament. This is because Grand Slam matches are played as best-of-five
sets instead as best-of-three sets. Because the contest lasts longer, it is more
likely that the better player wins. This interpretation is corroborated by the
fact that tournament type variation for women (who play best-of-three sets in
Grand Slam tournaments as well) is not significant. Finally, we test whether
the β parameter is the same for men and for women, and this hypothesis
is rejected: as in Du Bois and Heyndels we find that competitive balance in
women’s tennis is significantly lower than in men’s tennis.
Note however that the parameter β is not exogenous. The level of compe-
tition is determined by structural characteristics of tennis such as the surface
of the court, the seeding system, the scoring system, design of the tourna-
ments, size of the pool of professional players (Du Bois and Heyndels 2007).
del Corral (2008) argues that riskier strategies by underdogs are more effec-
tive on faster courts and for that reason outcome uncertainty will be higher
on faster playing surfaces than on slower surfaces. We do find that β is more
negative on clay courts than on grass courts, but this difference is not sig-
nificant, neither for men or women. β will also depend on prize incentives
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Figure 4 – Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient of the top 30 ranked tennis players at year’s
end (men)
in a tournament. Lallemand et al. (2008) examine how female tennis players
react to prize incentives and heterogeneity in ex ante players abilities. They
find that outcomes of tennis matches is determined more by differences in
abilities than by financial incentives. Men’s tennis is examined in Gilsdorf
and Sukhatme (2008) who find that increases in prize money differentials
have a positive effect on the probability that the higher ranked player wins
the match. Both studies confirm that financial incentives can be used as
an instrument to change competitive balance. Note that both studies focus
on the financial incentives of reaching the next round only, non-mone-
tary incentives such as the increase of points in the World Ranking (and
thereby, perhaps reaching a seeded position in the next tournament) are
ignored.
Inter-seasonal balance can be measured by calculating Spearman’s rank
correlation coefficient between two consecutive year’s end World Rankings.
Low persistence of the World Ranking in two consecutive seasons suggests a
balanced competition. We collected data on the last published World Rank-
ing in each year from 1984 until 2008. Figure 4 displays the evolution of rank
correlations of the top 30 players over time. The average rank correlation is
0.50, and clearly it varies noticeably from year to year. There is no discern-
able trend towards more persistence in ranking, or less persistence. Similar
conclusions are drawn if we do not restrict ourselves to persistence in the top
30, but in the top 20 or top 10. The mean value of the rank correlation of
the 20 best players is 0.41 during the period 1984 to 2007, that can be com-
pared to an average rank correlation in the Dutch Eredivisie of 0.69 during
the same time period. Soccer rankings are more persistent over time than the
World Ranking of tennis.
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4.2 Speed Skating
Speed skating (henceforth simply skating) is an individual sport that differs
from tennis in two important aspects. First, even though the contest is between
two skaters, the final ranking is based on an absolute measure of performance:
time skated. The athlete competes with all opponents. Second, absolute perfor-
mance of skaters has improved over time due to technological advances. Some
types of technology are available to all skaters (for example, an indoor skating
rink), other types were first available to a few, before the technology diffused
to others over time. Some advances, as the clap skate, have been available for
some time before they were adopted. Technological improvements are impor-
tant, consider for example Dutch female skaters who were among the first to
adopt the clap skate in the 1996/1997 season. Adoption by female skaters from
other countries occurred in the following season. During that season, early
adopters gained a significant improvement in performance, that disappeared
when the clap skate was adopted by other skaters as well.
Absolute competition in skating is measured by personal best times, or
by world records. The development of world records2 for men over time is
shown in Figure 5. Interestingly, skating times have continued to decrease
over time. To illustrate the effect of new technology as the clap skate, note
that the 1500m world record (men) improved from 1.50:05 to 1.46:43 during
the season the clap skate was adopted. Such a large within-season improve-
ment cannot be explained by a sudden increase in the size of the talent pool.
Other discrete improvements of technology, as for example the introduction
of indoor skating rinks, show similar effects on world records.
Relative competition (competition between skaters during one particular
event) can be analyzed using a similar approach to the one in Section 3.1.
Here, however, we use the absolute measure of performance, and we control
for the skating rink as times skated vary significantly between rinks due to
altitude and cover. We estimate the random effects model
log(Tit )= Rt +αi + i t , (3)
where Tit is the time of skater i in event t , Rt is the rink where the event
takes place, αi is the (unobserved) talent of skater i , and i t reflects all
other factors. The data set has 20500 observations and has results of the
main international tournaments since the 1975/1976 season. The model is
estimated separately for three types of distances (500m/1000m, 1500m, and
5000m/10000m), and for each season. The distribution of αi is identified
because there are multiple observations for a skater within one season. We do
not impose that the quality of a skater (as measured by αi ) remains constant
2 In this section, all skating times are expressed as time per 500m.
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Figure 5 – Development of world records in speed skating (men)
over time, because the model is estimated separately for each season between
1975/1976 and 2006/2007. Similar to the standard deviation of estimation
team quality σθ in Section 3.1, the standard deviation of αi , σα estimates the
variation of quality of skaters in a given season. To avoid excessive sensitiv-
ity to weak skaters and skaters who fell during their race, model (3) is esti-
mated using the times of the best twelve skaters in each event. Estimates for
σα and σε remain roughly constant over time, suggesting that the distribution
of individual effects has not changed that much. We find that σˆα ≈0.009 for
all three distance categories, and σˆε ≈0.008. σˆε is reasonably stable over time,
the variation of individual heterogeneity varies more from year to year. There
is no apparent trend in either component.
A second approach to measuring competition in skating is using the per-
formance differences between top contenders. As each skater competes with
all other skaters, and time is measured on a ratio scale, the time difference
between the best skater and the runner up is an indication of the level of
relative competition. This approach is used by Talsma and Sierksma (2008)
to derive an all-time ranking of skaters. In particular, it is of interest to
see whether the time difference between the fastest skaters in an event and
the second or thirds best has decreased over time, as suggested by Gould
(1996). In his model, it becomes progressively more difficult for the very























Figure 6 – The evolution of median time difference between first and third place in skating over
time (T(3) − T(1))
best athletes to improve themselves when performance is measured on an abso-
lute scale, while the next best athletes can catch up, thereby closing the gap and
reducing variation in performance. This model assumes no technological pro-
gress. As seen above, however, even the very best skaters improve themselves
over time because of technological advances. In Figure 6 we graph the median
time difference between the fastest skater, and the third best skater (the unit
of observation is each distance event at a tournament in a given season). The
World Sprint Speed Skating Championships were introduced in 1972 only, caus-
ing a significant increase in the number of skaters specializing on the 500m and
1000m distances. Clearly, contests on these distances have become more com-
petitive since then: during the 1986/1987 season the time difference between the
fastest and third best skaterwas 0.45 s, which decreased to 0.29 s in 1996/1997 and
0.17 s in 2006/2007. Such a marked increase of competition is not seen in 1500m
contests, or in 5 km/10 km contests. 5 km/10 km contests in particular are highly
specialized events,with only a limitednumber of skaters participating.Moreover,
inherent ability canmanifest itself more strongly in longer distances, and the role
of randomness will be smaller.
To assess persistence of quality differences over time, one could try to
estimate the autocorrelation of the individual effects αi over time. Besides
the obvious difficulty of estimating αi in the first place, it should be noted
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that participation in skating contests is regulated at a country level. Only a
fixed (small) number of skaters can enter the competition. Second tier skat-
ers from one country may not participate, even though they may be poten-
tially better than first tier skaters from other countries.3 For this reason, we
measure dominance and persistence at a country level. In particular, we cal-
culate the (inequality of) share of medals won by different countries, and the
rank correlation over time based on the share of medals won. First, we con-
sider competitiveness at country level. Skaters from only 13 countries have
won medals at major events, and CR 2 (the medal share of best two coun-
tries) measured since 1995/1996 varies between 0.45 and 0.69. This shows that
success in skating is highly concentrated; in a given season, only skaters from
a few countries win medals. Success is persistent as well, as judged from the
year-to-year Spearman’s rank correlation of the medal count. During these
13 seasons, it is on average 0.77.
Absolute competition in skating continues to improve significantly, relative
competition does not. Especially at the country level, success is persistent.
Casual observation confirms that the sport is lacking international appeal:
skating tournaments attract only a small audience in almost all countries
except The Netherlands. An important instrument to improve performance
is access to new technology and training methods. The emergence of profes-
sional skating teams that hire skaters from different countries, may help to
disseminate such knowledge.
5 CONCLUDING REMARKS
Based on our investigations in the previous sections, can we assess which
sport is most competitive? Although this depends on the distribution of tal-
ent in a particular sport we can use the models of the previous two sections
to separate the effect of talent variation from outcome variation, and make a
comparison of the three sports considered. As a benchmark, we compare the
probability that a median team or athlete wins against the best team or ath-
lete. This measure does not capture any persistence of performance. Details
of the calculations leading to Table 3 are in the Appendix4. In Table 3, we
give the winning probability during the 2007/2008 season, and the average
winning probability between 2000 and 2008. The order of magnitude of this
winning probability is remarkably similar between all sports in the long run.
Especially, the 500m/1000m is the most competitive sport in the long run. In
the short run, however, skating is least balanced and this is especially promi-
3 Obvious examples are Bart Veldkamp and Marnix ten Kortenaar, who chose to represent
Belgium and Austria respectively, after failing to qualify for major events in the Netherlands.
4 The Appendix with additional tables and graphs is available on www.rug.nl/staff/r.h.
koning.
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nent in the 5000m/10000m distance. Currently, that distance is dominated by
one skater, Sven Kramer.
In this paper we have proposed different measures of competitive
balance in sport. From these empirical measures, it is clear that different
dimensions are relevant, and in particular persistence of performance is an
important characteristic of international soccer and skating. In the case of
international soccer, one can argue that this persistence is partly due to the
organizational structure of the league, and therefor, can be changed by the
UEFA. In national soccer leagues, competitive balance varies noticeably from
year to year. Despite popular beliefs, it is hard to distinguish any trends. The
separation of performance variation into variation of talent and intrinsic ran-
domness of a given sport seems a useful approach to compare sports, and to
assess the efficiency of measures to control competitive balance. In particular
in individual sports, it is difficult to redistribute talent.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution Noncommercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distrib-
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